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Abstract. The safety analysis of interlocking railway systems involves
verifying collision and derailment freeness. In this paper we propose a
structured way of refining track plans, in order to expand track segments
so that they form collections of track segments. We show how the abstract
model can be model checked to ensure the safety properties, which must
also hold in the corresponding concrete track plan, so that we will never
need to model check the concrete track plan directly. We also identify
the minimal number of trains that needs to be considered as part of the
model checking, and we demonstrate the practicality of the approach on
various scenarios.
1 Introduction
Formal verification of railway control software has been identified as one of the
“Grand Challenges” of Computer Science [9]. As is typical with Formal Methods,
this challenge comes in two parts: the first addresses the question of whether the
mathematical models considered are legitimate representations of the physical
systems of concern. The modelling of the systems, as well as of proof obligations,
needs to be faithful. The second part is the question of how to utilize available
technologies, for example model checking or theorem proving. Whichever verifi-
cation process is adopted, it needs to be both effective and efficient.
In [11, 10] we propose a new modelling approach for railway interlockings. We
use CSP||B [13], which combines event-based with state-based modelling. This
reflects the double nature of railway systems, which involves events such as train
movements and, in the interlocking, state based reasoning. In this sense, CSP||B
offers the means for the natural modelling approach we strive for: the formal
models are close to the domain models. To the domain expert, this provides
traceability and ease of understanding. This addresses the first of the above
stated challenges: faithful modelling.
In this paper, we address the question of how to effectively and efficiently ver-
ify various safety properties within our CSP||B models. To this end we develop
a set of abstraction techniques for railway verification that allow the transfor-
mation of complex CSP||B models into less involved ones, prove that they are
correct, and demonstrate that they allow one to verify a variety of railway sys-
tems via model checking. The first set of abstractions reduces the number of
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trains that need to be considered in order to prove safety for an unbounded
number of trains. Their correctness proof involves slicing of event traces. The
second set of abstractions simplifies the underlying track topology. Here, the
correctness proof utilizes event abstraction specific to our application domain
similar to the ones suggested by Winter in [15].
Outline We first introduce our modelling language CSP||B. In Section 3 we
summarise our generic railway modelling approach using CSP||B, as described
in [11, 10]. In Section 4, we present our first set of abstraction techniques based on
event traces. Then in Section 5 we present our data abstraction techniques. The
application of the abstraction results is presented via a set of example scenarios
in Section 6. In Section 7 we put our contribution in the context of related
approaches.
2 Background to CSP||B
The CSP||B approach allows us to specify communicating systems using a com-
bination of the B-Method [4] and the process algebra CSP (Communicating
Sequential Processes) [7]. The overall specification of a combined communicat-
ing system comprises two separate specifications: one given by a number of CSP
process descriptions and the other by a collection of B machines. Our aim when
using B and CSP is to factor out as much of the “data-rich” aspects of a sys-
tem as possible into B machines. The B machines in our CSP||B approach are
classical B machines, which are components containing state and operations on
that state. The CSP||B theory [13] allows us to combine a number of CSP pro-
cesses Ps in parallel with machines Ms to produce Ps ‖ Ms which is the parallel
combination of all the controllers and all the underlying machines. Such a par-
allel composition is meaningful because a B machine is itself interpretable as a
CSP process whose event-traces are the possible execution sequences of its op-
erations. The invoking of an operation of a B machine outside its precondition
within such a trace is defined as divergence [12]. Therefore, our notion of consis-
tency is that a combined communicating system Ps ‖ Ms is divergence-free and
also deadlock-free.
A B machine clause declares a machine and gives it a name. The variables
of a B machine define its state. The invariant of a B machine gives the type
of the variables, and more generally it also contains any other constraints on
the allowable machine states. There is an initialisation which determines the
initial state of the machine. The machine consists of a collection of operations
that query and modify the state. Besides this kind of machine we also define
static B machines that provide only sets, constants and properties that do not
change during the execution of the system.
The language we use to describe the CSP processes for B machines is as
follows:
P ::= e?x !y → P(x ) | P1 2 P2 | P1 u P2 | if b then P1 else P2 end |
N (exp) | P1 ‖ P2 | P1 A‖B P2 | P1 ||| P2
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The process e?x !y → P(x ) defines a channel communication where x repre-
sents all data variables on a channel, and y represents values being passed along
a channel. Channel e is referred to as a machine channel as there is a corre-
sponding operation in the controlled B machine with the signature x ←− e(y).
Therefore the input of the operation y corresponds to the output from the CSP,
and the output x of the operation to the CSP input. Here we have simplified
the communication to have one output and one input but in general there can
be any number of inputs and outputs. The other CSP operators have the usual
CSP semantics.
For reasoning of CSP||B models we require the following notation.
– Since a B machine is interpretable as a CSP process, the various CSP refine-
ments also apply to CSP||B. In this paper we focus on trace refinement where
P vT Q if traces(Q) ⊆ traces(P). This refinement preserves safety proper-
ties, such as collision freedom or derailment freedom as we shall discuss in
Section 3.
– Furthermore, we apply CSP renaming f (P) and CSP hiding P \ A to CSP
processes, B machines and to CSP||B models, which all semantically repre-
sent sets of traces. Given a set of traces T , f (T ) represents the set of all
traces tr ∈ T where the events are replaced point-wise by the function f ;
T \ A to represent the set of all traces tr ∈ T where the events from the set
A are removed from tr .
– A system run σ (of a CSP||B model) of length n ≥ 0 is a finite sequence
σ = 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, . . . , en−1, sn〉
where the si , i = 0 . . .n, are states of the B machine, and the ei , 1 ≤ i ≤
n − 1, are events – either controlled by CSP and enabled in B when called,
or B events. Here we assume that s0 is a state after initialisation. Given a
system run σ, we can extract its trace of events:
events(σ) = 〈e0, . . . , en−1〉.
3 Modelling and safety verification of railway systems
using CSP||B
Together with railway engineers we developed a common view on the information
flow in railways. In physical terms a railway consists of, at least, four different
components. These components are shown in Figure 1. The Controller selects
and releases routes for trains. The Interlocking serves as a safety mechanism
with regards to the Controller and, in addition, controls and monitors the Track
equipment. The Track equipment consists of elements such as signals, points,
and track circuits (logical names for tracks and points from the track plan as
discussed above; in the railway domain, tracks and track circuits are often con-
fused): signals can show the aspects green or red; points can be in normal position
(leading trains straight ahead) or in reverse position (leading trains to a different
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line) and track circuits detect if there is a train on a track. Finally, Trains have a
driver who determines their behaviour. For the purposes of modelling, we make
the assumption that track equipment reacts instantly and is free of defects. The
information flow shown in Figure 1 is as follows: the controller sends a request
message to the interlocking to which the interlocking responds; the interlocking
sends signalling information to the trains; and the trains inform the interlocking
about their movements. The interlocking serves as the system’s clock: messages
can be exchanged once per cycle.
Controller
Interlocking
  Track 
equipment
Trains
Route request, Request response,
Signal and point
settings Track occupation
Signal aspect Current movement
Route release Release response
Fig. 1. Information flow.
In this paper, we study various track plans,
one of which is a station illustrated in Fig-
ure 2(b). It depicts the scheme plan for the
station, which comprises a track plan, a con-
trol table, and release tables. (We will discuss
Figure 2(a) in Section 6).
The track plan provides the topological in-
formation of the station which consists of 16
tracks (e.g., the track c TAA), three signals
(e.g., S1), and two points (e.g., P1). Note that
the tracks include entry and exit tracks on
which trains can “appear” and “disappear”.
These two kinds of tracks are specially treated
during verification.
An interlocking system gathers train loca-
tions, and sends out commands to control signal aspects and point positions.
The control table determines how the station interlocking system sets signals
and points. For each signal, there is one row describing the condition under
which the signal can show proceed. There are two rows for signal S1: one for the
main line (Route A1) and one for the side line (Route B1). A route comprises
tracks and points between two signals. For example, signal S1 for the main line
can only show proceed when point P1 is in normal (straight) position and tracks
c TAA, c TAB , c TAC , c TAD , c TAE , c TAF , c TAG are all clear. Here
we assume that trains are equipped with an Automatic Train Protection sys-
tem which prevents trains from moving over a red light and therefore, overlaps
are not needed, e.g., the overlap for Route A1 would be c TAH . For further
discussion on this see [8].
The interlocking also allocates locks on points to particular route requests to
keep them locked in position, and releases such locks when trains have passed.
For example, the setting of Route A1 obtains a lock on point P1, and sets it to
normal. The lock is released after the train has passed the point. Release tables
store the relevant track.
In this setting, we consider two safety properties: collision-freedom excludes
two trains occupying the same track; and no-derailment says that whenever a
train enters a point, the point is set to cater for this; e.g., when a train travels
from track c TAG to track c TAH , point P2 is set so that it connects c TAG
and c TAH (and not c TBD and c TAH ). The correct design for the con-
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Control table
Route Normal Reverse Clear
A1 P1 c TAA, c TAB , c TAC , c TAD ,
c TAE , c TAF , c TAG
B1 P1 c TAA, c TAB , c TAC , c TBA,
c TBB , c TBC , c TBD
A2 P2 c TAH , c TAI , c TAJ
B2 P2 c TAH , c TAI , c TAJ
Release tables
P1 Occupied
A1 c TAD
B1 c TBA
P2 Occupied
A2 c TAI
B2 c TAI
Fig. 2. One Station - Abstract (a) and Concrete (b) Track Plan (Scenario 2 from Fig. 4)
trol table and release tables is safety-critical: mistakes can lead to collision or
derailment.
3.1 CSP||B modelling of railways
In previous work [10, 11] we have demonstrated that CSP||B caters for railways.
It is possible to read the actual models together with railway engineers in or-
der to validate them. This review demonstrates that the models can be clearly
understood by railway engineers. Here, we refrain from elaborating on the mod-
elling approach and refer the interested reader to [11] for the details. However,
the concepts from the models central for verification (in Section 4 and Section 5),
namely static and dynamic state representation and also train movements, are
discussed below.
The static state information of a CSP||B model is defined in context ma-
chines, i.e., machines that contain set and function definitions. For example,
the names of all the track circuits is defined in a set called ALLTRACKS. The
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topology of the track plan is captured using a collection of relations that capture
how the elements of the track plan are related. For example, next : TRACK ↔
TRACK is a relation between tracks and possible successor tracks. Therefore,
(c TAC , a TAD) and (c TAC , c TBA) are elements of the next relation within
the one-station example in Figure 2.
The Interlocking machine models the dynamics of the system. Its state evolves
over time. It consists of the following variables: pos representing the position of
all trains, nextd representing the current position of all points (and thus the
dynamic relation between tracks and their successors), signalStatus represent-
ing the aspect of each signal, normalPoints representing the points which are
in normal position, reversePoints representing the points which are in reverse
position, and currentLocks representing the current semaphores on points.
In the CSP||B models, a train a can perform one of the following events:
move.a.currp.newp represents a moving from track currp to track newp, nextSig-
nal.a.aspect represents a seeing the particular aspect (red or green) at the next
signal, enter.a.p represents placing a on an entry track p, and exit.a.p represents
a leaving the system. Trains that have left the system can be placed again on an
entry track; we call this behaviour recurring trains. Note that in the situation
where currp and newp are separated by a signal the event move.a.currp.newp is
possible only if this signal shows green.
4 Identifying appropriate trace abstractions in order to
constrain the model checking
The state space of our railway models grew fast with the number of trains
involved:
number of trains 1 2 3 4 5 6
number of states 31 161 813 3859 17315 74205
The above table demonstrates this dependency for the linear track plan shown
in the middle of in Figure 3(b) which has two routes, where each route consists
of two tracks.
In this section we provide two methods of how to reduce the number of trains
when proving collision freedom and derailment freedom.
4.1 Minimum number of trains for verifying collision
The following theorem turns the question if a railway scheme plan is collision free
into a finite state problem by reducing the – in principle – unbounded number
of trains to be considered into a finite number:
Theorem 1. Let S be a railway scheme plan with r routes. S is collision free
iff all systems runs with r + 1 recurring trains are collision free.
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Proof. We prove the “if” direction only, as the other direction trivially holds.
We first note that if there are two trains on a route then a collision can occur
(as these two trains are not separated by a signal). Therefore, as long as there is
no collision there will be at most r trains on S . Assuming we have r + 1 trains
there will always be one train available to move onto an entry track. Thus, r + 1
recurring trains are sufficient. uunionsq
4.2 Minimum number of trains for verifying derailment
Regarding derailment, we obtain an even stronger result. The reduction argu-
ment, however, holds only for “reasonable” scheme-plans where the various tables
are free of trivial mistakes with respect to the railway topology. Concretely, we
say that a scheme plan is well-formed if the following conditions hold:
1. Release-Table condition. Locks of a route can only be released by a train
movement on this route (e.g., in Figure 2, there is the lock c TAD on P1 for
route A1; c TAD appears in the clear column of the control table for the
route A1).
2. Clear-Table condition. The clear table of a route contains at least the
tracks of this route (e.g., in Figure 2 route A1 topologically goes from signal
S1 to signal S3 and all tracks from c TAA to c TAG are in the clear column
of the control table for the route A1).
3. Normal/Reverse-Table condition. The normal table or the reverse table
of a route contain at least the points on this route (e.g., in Figure 2 route
A1 topologically goes from signal S1 to signal S3, it includes the only point
P1, and P1 is in the normal column of the control table for the route A1).
4. Route condition. Topologically different routes are distinguishable by point
positions in the control table (e.g., in Figure 2 route A1 and route B1 are
topologically different, point P1 is in the normal column of the control table
for route A1, point P1 is in the reverse column of the control table for route
B1).
5. Lock-Table condition. Routes with different lock tables are distinguish-
able by point positions in the control table (e.g., in Figure 2 route A1 and
route B1 have different lock table entries, namely, c TAD and c TBA re-
spectively, in the control table the position of P1 distinguishes them as seen
above).
The scheme plan of Figure 2 is well-formed.
Note that there is exactly one condition per table (release table, clear table,
normal/reverse table, lock table) plus one condition which links routes as defined
topologically with the route definition in the tables. All five conditions are static
and can easily be decided for a given scheme-plan. It is worthwhile to point out
that well-formedness does not imply the property “no-derailment”:
Observation 1 There exist well-formed scheme-plans with derailment.
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For example, altering the scheme plan of Figure 2 by exchanging the posi-
tion of point P2 for route A2 and route B2 leads to derailment as explained in
Section 3. This exchange, however, preserves well-formedness.
Our current modelling refrains from explicitly representing the routes which
are set. Therefore, we need to establish the following theorem:
Theorem 2. For all system runs of a well-formed scheme-plans holds: When a
signal s shows green, then there exists a route r with signal(r) = s which is set.
We now define a reduction method that will allow us to establish Theorem 3
below. The starting point is a system run σ which involves k ≥ 1 trains. Let
Trains = {a1, . . . , ak} and an additional train b, where b does not derail in σ.
From this run σ we construct a new system run σ′ which
– does not speak about b, which,
– however, preserves the movement of all trains a ∈ Trains.
The events in σ concerning b are:
E (b) := {e ∈ s |e = move.b.currp.newp
e = nextSignal.b.aspect
e = enter.b.p
e = exit.b.p}
In a system run σ, the train b can influence the trains a ∈ Trains in two ways:
(i) b might prevent a train a ∈ Trains from moving (because a signal in front of
a shows red because b uses a resource); (ii) b might allow a train in Trains to
move (a move from b releases a lock, so that the signal in front of a can change
to green). When “taking away” b from σ our only concern is (ii): we wish to
preserve moves. This insight leads to the definition of the following replacement
function replaceb concerning events (where  stands for the empty work, i.e., for
deletion of the event):
1. replaceb(e) = e if e /∈ E (b)
2. replaceb(move.b.currp.newp) = release.r.bb if there exists a signal s with
currp = homeSignal(s). As move is only enabled if signal s shows green, The-
orem 2 guarantees that there exists a route r which is set. Well-formedness
of the scheme-plan guarantees uniqueness.
3. replaceb(e) =  if e is any of move.b.currp.newp, where currp 6= homeSignal(s)
for any signal s, or nextSignal.b.aspect, or enter.b.p, or exit.b.p.
replaceb keeps all events not related to b (1.), releases all locks related to b at
the earliest possible opportunity (2.), and deletes all other events related to b.
We want to show that, given a system run σ = 〈s0, e0, s1, e1, . . . , en−1, sn〉,
there exists a system run σ′ such that
events(σ′) = 〈replaceb(e0), . . . , replaceb(en−1)〉
To this end, we need to relate the states in σ and σ′:
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In case of “deletion”
there is no state change in σ′:
S move.b.currp.newp S ′
≤ b ≤ b
T  T
In case of “replacement”,
states can change in σ and σ′,e.g.,
S move.b.currp.newp S ′
≤ b ≤ b
T release.R.bb T ′
If S relates to T , all trains a ∈ Trains shall in T be in the same position
as in S , where T naturally, does not speak about the train b. Furthermore, the
state T shall offer trains a ∈ Trains the same possibilities to move as they would
have in S . To capture these ideas formally, we define that S ≥b T if
1. Compared to S , T just deletes the information regarding b.
T (pos) = S (pos) \ {b 7→ track | track ∈ TRACK}
2. Track equipment is in the same state.
S (nextd) = T (nextd) S (signalStatus) = T (signalStatus)
S (normalPoints) = T (normalPoints) S (reversePoints) = T (reversePoints)
3. A route r causes locks in T only if it does so in S :
S (currentLocks[{r}]) = ∅ ⇒ T (currentLocks[{r}]) = ∅ and
T (currentLocks[{r}]) 6= ∅ ⇒ S (currentLocks[{r}]) = T (currentLocks[{r}])
Using this relation ≥b, we can establish the following theorem:
Theorem 3. For any collision free system run on a well-formed scheme plan
involving k ≥ 1 trains Trains = {a1, . . . , ak} and a train b which does not derail
in this run, there exists a system run involving only the trains {a1, . . . , ak} with
identical movements.
Proof. (Sketch) By induction on the length of a system run σ. The base case
is given by S0 ≥b S0 where S0 is the initial state which has no trains in and
locks of points. In the induction step we show: (i) if an event e is enabled in S
then replaceb(e) is enabled in the corresponding state; (ii) ≥b is preserved under
the execution under an event e and its corresponding event replaceb(e). Both
arguments rely on the fact that σ is a system run, i.e., is a control flow allowed
by the CSP processes. uunionsq
The condition “collision free” on the system run σ is required, as we “sim-
ulate” the movement of the train b by a route release request. Routes can only
be released if there is no train on the track t directly in front of the correspond-
ing signal. In the corresponding run σ′, b will not be on track t , as b has been
removed. There might, however, be another train a. We exclude this by the con-
dition “collision freedom”: if there was a train a on the same track t as train b,
there would be a collision in σ.
Corollary 1. For collision free and well-formed scheme plans holds: if they are
derailment free for one train, then they are derailment free for any number of
trains.
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5 Towards a data abstraction framework of CSP||B
railway models
In this section we demonstrate a refinement between two track plans. We want a
structured way of doing this so that if collision-freeness and derailment-freeness
is shown using the techniques from Section 4 on an abstract track plan then
it is preserved automatically for a concrete track plan. This will allow model-
checking on the abstract version, which will be more efficient, and allow the
results to carry over to the concrete version.
Fig. 3. Linear Scenario Abstraction
Let us consider two exam-
ples to aid our understand-
ing. To appreciate the impact
on model checking, Figure 3
shows one abstract track plan
(a) that corresponds to two
different concrete track plans,
one with two tracks per ab-
stract route (b) and one with
four tracks per abstract route
(c). As in Section 4, this state
space also grows fast, how-
ever, here in the number of
tracks per route (illustrated
using 3 trains):
number of tracks per abstract track 2 4 8 16
number of states 806 1472 3483 9615
To further visualise the abstraction of track circuits, Figure 2(b) shows an
illustration of a concrete track plan to which Figure 2(a) shows an abstract
track plan. In the following, we discuss how to formalise such an abstraction and
suitable conditions.
As discussed in Section 3.1, a track plan is essentially given by the set
ALLTRACK of its track circuits and a relation next between them. We use
the prefix a for abstract, and c for concrete when considering two track plans
and the relationship between them. Thus, a ALLTRACK is the abstract set of
track circuits (of tracks and points). Similarly, c ALLTRACK is the concrete
set of track circuits. We assume that these are disjoint, apart from the special
element nullTrack . The relations a next and c next define how track circuits
are connected. Each concrete track circuit is associated with one abstract track
circuit, defined by the following total surjective function:
abs : c ALLTRACK → a ALLTRACK
such that abs(nullTrack) = nullTrack .
Model Checking Abstractions of Complex Railway Models 11
The definition of abs for the one-station example is as follows in terms of
relational image:
abs[{c TAA, c TAB , c TAC}] = {a TAA}
abs[{c TBA, c TBB , c TBC , c TBD}] = {a TBA}
abs[{c TAD , c TAE , c TAF , c TAG}] = {a TAB}
abs[{c TAH }] = {a TAC}
abs[{c TAI , c TAJ}] = {a TAD}
There are a number of necessary conditions on the abstraction function abs.
These include prominently:
– Points are preserved under abstraction, i.e., a track circuit belonging to a
point in the concrete topology is mapped to a point in the abstract topology.
– Routes are preserved under abstraction, e.g.,
abs[{c TAD , c TAE , c TAF , c TAG , c TAH }] cannot be {a TBA} since
the set of concrete track circuits is not within one route.
– Any concrete c next pair of track circuits should either both be related to
the same abstract track circuit, or should reflect the relation between and
abstract a next pair, i.e.,
∀ c t1, c t2 • (c t1 7→ c t2) ∈ c next)⇒
abs(c t1) = abs(c t2) ∨ (abs(c t1) 7→ abs(c t2)) ∈ a next
For example, a move within the same abstract track circuit is given by
(c TAB 7→ c TAC ) ∈ c next ⇒ abs(c TAB) = abs(c TAC ).
Beside the abs function, there are further functions needed in order to de-
scribe the full abstraction between track plans. They allow to formulate further
conditions upon the relations defined in a track plan also on the tables, e.g.,
a clearTable o9 abs
−1 = c clearTable
Our modelling approach works generically for all scheme plans. Thus, given
a concrete and an abstract one, we have two formal models to compare. This
comparison is performed using B refinement and CSP trace refinement. In the
following, we focus on the B refinement.
We establish the refinement relationship between the Interlocking B machines
by relating states with a linking invariant. To this end, we prove that each
operation preserves the linking invariant. The linking invariant consists of three
parts: the relationship between the positions of the trains a pos = c pos o9abs, the
relationship between the current positions of the points (which follows directly
due to the static relationships), and the relationship between the track equipment
which remains unchanged.
We illustrate the proof by comparing abstract and concrete versions of the
move operation. For example, the concrete move.c TAC .c TAD corresponds to
the abstract move.a.a TAA.a TAB ; here, both have an effect on the B state. In
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contrast to this, the concrete move.a.c TAB .c TAC corresponds to the abstract
move.a.a TAA.a TAA; the latter has no effect on the B state. Therefore, we
can consider the abstract event move.a.a TAA.a TAA as the B operation skip.
In a B refinement, a new concrete event can refine skip. This can be expressed
in the following two lemmas:
Lemma 1 (Renamed move). If (abs(c t1) 7→ abs(c t2)) ∈ a next then
abs(c t1), abs(c t2)←− a move(t) v c t1, c t2←− c move(t)
Lemma 2 (New move). If abs(c t1) = abs(c t2) then
c t1, c t2←− skip(t) v c t1, c t2←− c move(t)
As a consequence of the above lemmas (and similar lemmas for all other
operations) the relationship between the abstract machine MA and the concrete
one MC is given by MA vT f (MC \ N ), where f and N are defined by:
f (move.a.currp.newp) = move.a.abs(currp).abs(newp)
N = {move.a.currp.newp | abs(currp) = abs(newp)}
for all trains a in the abstract and the concrete model.
Hence we can now consider the combination of the B machines MA and CSP
processes PA to obtain:
Theorem 4. Let abs be an abstraction function from a concrete topology to an
abstract topology. Let PA ‖ MA be the CSP||B model wrt the abstract topology, let
PC ‖ MC be the CSP||B model wrt the concrete topology, such that both models
are defined over the same set of trains. Let
1. MA vT f (MC \ N ) and
2. PA vT f (PC \ N ).
Then collision (derailment) freedom of PA ‖ MA implies collision (derailment)
freedom of PC ‖ MC .
Proof. We compute:
PA ‖ MA vT f (PC \ N ) ‖ f (MC \ N ) (by conditions 1 and 2)
vT f (PC \ N ‖ MC \ N ) (by distributivity of renaming)
vT f ((PC ‖ MC ) \ N ) (by distributivity of hiding)
With regards to collision freedom, we obtain:
PA ‖ MA is collision free⇒ f ((PC ‖ MC ) \ N ) is collision free
(by trace refinement)
⇔ PC ‖ MC \ N is collision free
(as f (collision) = collision)
⇔ PC ‖ MC is collision free (as collision /∈ N )
Similarly for derailment freedom. uunionsq
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Note that Theorem 4 decomposes the proof obligation into a B proof and a
CSP proof respectively. In order to establish condition 1, we sketched above a
general construction based upon techniques related to B refinement. Condition
2 can be verified using the model checker FDR on CSP processes only.
6 Example scenarios of CSP||B railway models
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques outlined in Section 4
and Section 5 we conducted experiments on four scenarios. The experiments were
carried out using ProB 1.3.5 beta 15 [3] to verify the collision and derailment
freedom of the abstract and concrete track plans using CTL model checking
over the CSP||B models. If the verification is successful then we conclude that
the model is right and has the right properties. The CSP||B models were also
required to be divergence- and deadlock-free. Figure 4 summarises that all our
scenarios are collision- and derailment-free.
In scenarios 1, 2 and 3 we have performed experiments based on the number
of trains required to verify derailment freedom and the number of trains required
to verify collision freedom being one more than the number of routes. To give an
indication of the size of the models: scenario 1(a) has 6 tracks, 0 points, 2 signals
and 2 routes; scenario 2 has 16 tracks, 2 points, 3 signals and 4 routes; scenario 3
has 15 tracks, 1 point, 5 signals and 6 routes, and finally scenario 4 has 22 tracks,
2 points, 9 signals and 10 routes. Notice that there is a significant reduction in the
number of states being explored in all the abstract scenarios, the concrete track
plan of scenario 3(b) failed to complete within a reasonable time. Note that in
the case of the double junction we only performed the verification using 2 trains.
Our conjecture is that verifying collision-freedom is enough with two trains and
that the worst case scenario of verifying collision freedom using 11 trains is
not required. The double junction scenario is one which we have referred to in
our previous work [11], it provides an interesting example of abstraction since
the abstraction surrounding one of the points is a biased one, i.e., the normal
position of one of the points remains unchanged in the abstraction, whereas the
reverse position of the point is an abstraction of its track circuit and another
track circuit.
7 Related work
Several industrial studies have been done on using model checking to verify
railway applications, e.g., for example SNCF [2], and it is clear that their formal
is industrially important. A comparison of the use of different model checkers in
the analysis of control tables has been conducted by Ferrari et al. [5]. Winter in
a recent paper [14] considers different optimising strategies for model checking
using NuSMV and demonstrates the efficiency of their approach on very large
models. These analyses are at a lower level of abstraction than our models as the
models are defined in terms of boolean equations and do not focus on providing
behavioural models.
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Scenario Model Description Number Abstract Concrete
of Trains States Checked States Checked
1(a)(i) Linear with 2 concrete
tracks per abstract track
1 27 31
1(a)(ii) Linear with 2 concrete
tracks per abstract track
3 596 806
1(b)(i) Linear with 4 concrete
tracks per abstract track
1 27 39
1(b)(ii) Linear with 4 concrete
tracks per abstract track
3 596 1472
2(a) Station 1 70 203
2(b) Station 5 151508 968700
3(a) Single Junction 1 600 756
3(b) Single Junction 7 326405 Not completed
4 Double Junction 2 173846 379404
Fig. 4. Variations of Four Example Scenarios checked
Others have applied theorem proving in the verification of railway interlock-
ing systems, for example, the Advance FP7 project [1] is developing Event-B
models of such systems and verifying comparable safety properties. Indeed it
would be interesting for us to investigate further the relationship between the
combination of generic proofs and model checking. In this paper, we have demon-
strated that the data abstraction on the B part of the CSP||B models is generic
but more work will be needed on this when we enrich the models to contain
trains which extend over more than one track circuit and can move in more than
one direction.
The research most closely related to ours is Winter [15]. The way in which
the ASM models are defined closely resonate with ours since they have the same
concept of routes, which contain tracks and points, between two signals, and
contain a static and a behavioural definition. Their models are more advanced
than ours since we currently restrict ourselves to have signals in one direction and
we do not include shunting. The simplifications to the Winter models includes
combining multiple track circuits into one provided they are always grouped
together in the control table; this again resonates with the data abstraction we
defined in Section 5, but we formalise the abstraction more explicitly.
8 Conclusion
We have successfully complemented our faithful modelling approach of railway
interlockings as presented in [11, 10] by defining abstraction techniques that yield
effective and efficient verification process based on model checking. We illus-
trated this process in terms of various scenarios. The correctness arguments in
Sections 4 provides a new proof technique for event- and state-based reasoning.
Section 5 demonstrates an interesting data abstraction using decomposition.
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Heitmeyer in [6] discusses the importance of complete abstractions. Our ab-
stractions are sound. It is future work to investigate if completeness can be
established. In Section 6 we identified that the reduction of Theorem 1 is not
sufficient for complex scheme plans. Here we hope to prove our conjecture that
two trains are sufficient to verify collision freedom. Our current models lack cer-
tain details as discussed in Section 7. Adding these features will allow us to study
more fine grained data abstractions. Following recent discussions with Winter,
we also agree that another obvious optimisation to consider is the decomposition
of track schemes.
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